Trump Trade Policy Parsed

At a WITA-hosted panel Friday, former senior U.S. trade officials described an increasingly chaotic and opaque landscape for global trading partners navigating the Trump administration’s tariff policy. Former Assistant USTRs Wendy Cutler, Mark Linscott, Daniel Mullaney, and policy advisor Michael Smart outlined a central and unresolved problem: the uncertain role and treatment of Section 232 tariffs in current negotiations.

“The biggest concern throughout this discussion is the 232s,” said Wendy Cutler, now Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “Our FTA partners are being penalized here because they’ve already given up their tariffs. You thought you had a congressionally approved deal. Now you’re being told that may not matter. Are these deals worth anything?”

The panel highlighted the lack of clarity around how—or whether—Section 232 tariffs (originally imposed on national security grounds) will be adjusted through bilateral negotiations.

“Each 232 negotiation presents its own problem,” explained Daniel Mullaney, former Assistant USTR for Europe and the Middle East. “These aren’t formulaic. For Japan and Korea, 232 relief is the primary objective—not just existing tariffs on steel and aluminum, but exemptions from future actions. That’s a complex and unresolved issue.”

Michael Smart, managing director at Rock Creek Global Advisors, noted that countries are increasingly concerned not just about tariffs but about the durability of any commitments. “There’s broad uncertainty about the sanctity of these deals,” he said. “Trading partners don’t know if they’ll still be honored once new tariffs are imposed under another 232 action weeks later.”

For ASEAN nations, the calculus is different but equally fraught. Most are grappling with supply chain vulnerabilities stemming from China’s dominant market position and potential coercive responses.

“ASEAN countries are concerned with both tariffs and broader pressures to decouple from China,” said Cutler. “They’re wary of signing onto provisions that could be perceived as overtly anti-China—especially with little assurance of stable U.S. policy in return.”

Mark Linscott, former Assistant USTR for South and Central Asia, emphasized the particular disadvantage facing FTA partners like Australia, Singapore, and Korea.

“They’ve already lowered their tariffs to zero and now have nothing to trade away,” he said. “That puts them in a worse negotiating position than countries like India or Vietnam that can make tariff concessions. There’s no indication so far that this White House is putting any value on our existing FTAs.”

The conversation also touched on the volatile and often personal nature of Trump-era trade diplomacy. The panel referenced the letter to Brazil threatening a 50% tariff, which Linscott called “jaw-dropping” and “clearly political,” noting its inclusion of non-trade grievances.

On the broader geopolitical context, China’s absence from the negotiating table was noted. While other partners have engaged, Beijing has retaliated, not bargained—yet a potential Trump-Xi summit may alter that trajectory.

“For many partners, the fear is they’ll make politically difficult concessions to align with U.S. economic security goals on China—only to see the U.S. cut a separate deal,” said Mullaney. “That dynamic plays out in Europe and in Asia.”

As the August 1 deadline approaches for reaching bilateral understandings with key trading partners, the panelists warned that comparisons among countries’ outcomes will only increase tensions.

“When Malaysia or the Philippines gets the same tariff rate as Vietnam—which reportedly agreed to full tariff elimination—people start asking: what was the point of making concessions?” said Cutler. “The perception of fairness is critical.”

[Link to Event Recording]